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Punishing Offensive Conduct on University Campuses:
Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
George Mason University
During the 1980s, many American colleges and universities launched
efforts to increase their students' sensitivity to the concerns of women and
of racial and ethnic minorities. Some schools undertook long-term initia-
tives to promote greater understanding of the history of African Ameri-
cans.2 Others expanded their curricula to include courses designed to
expose "European white male" biases embodied in Western institutions or
latent in classic works of Western literature.
3
Accompanying the growth of such programmatic and curricular initia-
tives was the development of campus codes of speech and conduct, created
to discourage manners of speaking and acting that might be taken as offen-
sive to particular segments of the university population.4 In a 1991 article,
1. Such efforts comprise a key component of what has derisively become known as the
"political correctness" movement. For a sympathetic treatment of the 'PC" cause, see JUNG MIN
CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE PoLrmcs AND PHmOSOPHY OF POLmCAL CoREcrTNss (1992).
For decidedly less sympathetic views, see ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLosnao OF THE AMERICAN MID
(1987); DINFSH D'SouzA, IL.mI.AL EDUCATION: THF PoLrrlcs OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS
(1991); and ROGER KIMBALL, TENuRD RADICALS: How PoLmCs HAS CoRRUVrD OUR HIGHER
EDUCATION (1990).
2. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for example, has been the site of a
debate concerning the merits, funding, and campus location of a center devoted to the study and
appreciation of African-American history and culture. For details of this highly controverted is-
sue, see Dispute Over Black Center Tears U. of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1993, at
B 11; Ashley Fogle, A Place to Celebrate Black Culture Racially Divides a Campus, L.A. Taims,
Oct. 11, 1992, at M5; Celeste E. Whittaker, UNC Will Get Black Cultural Center, But Site May
Mean Uproar Isn't Over, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 29, 1993, at A3.
3. This brand of scholarship is called "deconstructionism.' Its origin in this country is usu-
ally attributed to the 1976 English translation of Jacques Derrida's DE LA GRAmmATOLOGm
(1967). See SHARON CiowLEY, A TEACmE's INTRODUCTION TO DECONSRmUnON at x (1989).
Deconstructionists examine a given text not to discern the author's intended meaning, but rather to
discover the writing's sub-texts-for example, its built-in racial, gender, and religious biases. See
CoNTINENTAL PHILosopHy II: DERRIDA AND DECONSTRUCTION 4 (Hugh J. Silverman ed., 1989).
4. The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor implemented one such code in 1988. Re-
sponding to racist incidents on campus, university officials announced a rule exposing students to
discipline for "[any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnaih-era veteran status," and that interferes with an individual's
employment or participation in university studies or activities. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The university's president sought to justify the school's action
by stating:
[J]ust as an individual cannot shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater and then claim immu-
nity from prosecution for causing a riot on the basis of exercising his rights of free
speech, so a great many American universities have taken the position that students at a
university cannot by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously offend
many individuals beyond the immediate victim, and which therefore detract from the
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conservative writer Dinesh D'Souza recounted the promulgation of one
such set of rules:
In 1987, the law school faculty of the State University of New
York at Buffalo adopted a resolution that warned students not to
make "remarks directed at another's race, sex, religion, national
origin, age, or sexual preference," including "ethnically deroga-
tory statements, as well as other remarks based on prejudice and
group stereotype." Students who violated this rule should not ex-
pect protection under the First Amendment, the faculty resolution
suggested, because "our intellectual community shares values that
go beyond a mere standardized commitment to open and unre-
strained debate."5
In Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univer-
sity,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the First Amendment poses any bar to a university's imposition of
sanctions on students who engage in speech and conduct that university
administrators find to conflict with the school's express mission 7 of provid-
ing an educational environment free from overt manifestations of racism
and sexism.' Members of the Sigma Chi fraternity had initiated the lawsuit
after George Mason University officials imposed sanctions on the fraternity
for events that transpired at a fraternity-sponsored "ugly woman contest.",
necessary educational climate of a campus, claim immunity from a campus disciplinary
proceeding. I believe that position to be valid.
Id. at 855. The Doe court struck down the rule for overbreadth and vagueness. Id. at 866-67; see
also infra note 158.
5. Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: Current Controversies in American Higher Edu-
cation, ATLAnc MoNTmy, Mar. 1991, at 51. See generally ARr7 R. KoRWAR, WAR OF
WORDS: SPEECH CODES AT PUBLIC COL ES AND UNIvRSrrIEs (1994) (discussing campus
codes of speech and conduct, based on a study of 533 American colleges and universities).
6. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
7. George Mason University's mission statement provided, inter alia, that the university "is
committed to promoting a culturally and racially diverse student body;" that "[e]ducation here is
not limited to the classroom;" and that the university is "committed to teaching the values of equal
opportunity and equal treatment, respect for diversity, and individual dignity." Id. at 388.
8. The case quickly assumed a place in the "political correctness" debate. E.g., Clarence
Page, Insensitive Students Get Taste of Own Bitter Medicine, OR.ANDO Smnmqr. TRW., Sept. 6,
1991, at A15 (retelling the account of one George Mason student who opposed "campus 'political
correctness"' and described a forum held by George Mason officials as a witch-hunt: "'By the
end of the forum,' [the student] writes, 'the sorority representatives were in tears, confessing their
guilt as they held hands for mutual support."'); First Amendment Rights: Testing Free Speech,
Amz. REPUBLIC, May 19, 1993, at A14 (describing the facts of the Sigma Chi case and concluding
that "[tihis debate pitting politically correct policy over constitutional rights is tearing apart the
nation's campuses'); Lessons in Protest and Tolerance, N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 3, 1991, at A22 (noting
that the Sigma Chi case demonstrates how "[ciolleges and universities have been having a turbu-
lent time deciding what speech and action are permissible on campus"); The BadNews About Free
Speech, WASH. Tmms, May 17, 1993, at E2 (stating that "at GMU, Political Correctness took it on
the chin").
9. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 387; see also infta notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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The court held that inherently expressive activities merit full First
Amendment protection. 10 Because the contest was inherently expressive,
the court ruled, the university could not impose sanctions on the fraternity.
Rather, the university must find ways of furthering its interests that do not
restrict students' rights to free speech."
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence, focusing especially on the protection of conduct as speech 2 and
on the Court's application of First Amendment principles to school set-
tings.'" The Note reaches two primary conclusions. First, the Court of Ap-
peals may have applied an improper test in determining whether the
fraternity's contest merited full First Amendment protection.'4 Second, the
court misconstrued free speech principles when it suggested that universi-
ties may not restrict students' speech or expressive conduct to further com-
pelling school interests.'5
In April 1991, members of the Sigma Chi fraternity at George Mason
University held their second annual "Derby Days" event, designed to enter-
tain the university community and to raise funds for charity.'6 As part of
the "Derby Days" program, the fraternity sponsored an "ugly woman con-
test," in which six competing sorority teams dressed eighteen members of
the fraternity as "ugly women."' 7 At the contest, one caucasian fraternity
member was painted black, wore a stringy black wig and clothes stuffed
with pillows to exaggerate breasts and buttocks, and parodied a stereotypi-
cal African-American accent.'"
Soon after the event, nearly 250 students signed a petition condemning
the event for its racist and sexist themes.' 9 The Dean for Student Services,
members of the student government, and other student leaders later con-
cluded that the event had created a "hostile learning environment for wo-
men and blacks, incompatible with the University's mission."2 0 In light of
this finding, the Dean imposed sanctions on the fraternity, restricting the
members' social activities to pre-approved pledging and philanthropic
10. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 391.
11. Id. at 393. Although the fraternity member did utter words in a parody of Afri-
can-American slang during the "ugly woman contest," id. at 388, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals narrowly framed the issue as whether the contest as conduct was sufficiently expressive
to merit First Amendment protection, id. at 389.
12. See infra notes 41-68, 103-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 78-101, 151-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
16. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 387.
17. Id. at 387-88.
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id.
20. Id; see supra note 7 for relevant portions of the university's mission statement.
1994]
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events and requiring the fraternity to create a program focused on diversity
and the concerns of women.21
In June 1991, the fraternity sought declaratory and injunctive relief in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,22 claiming the university's imposition of sanctions violated
its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.23 Although discovery had not
yet been completed, 4 the court granted the fraternity's motion for summary
judgment.25
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 26 The court
found that the First Amendment protects nonobscene live entertainment be-
cause of its expressive character.27 Although admittedly offensive and of
very low quality, the contest was in the form of a skit and constituted inher-
ently expressive' entertainment; as such, the court ruled, it was entitled to
full First Amendment protection.29 In so holding, the court exempted the
contest from the two-part test, announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Texas v. Johnson,3" usually applied to determine if conduct is suf-
ficiently expressive to implicate the First Amendment.31
The university had argued on appeal that the contest was not inherently
expressive and that the two-part Johnson test should be applied.3 2 If the
21. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 388.
22. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1992).
23. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 388. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "IN]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
24. Brief of Appellants at 4, Sigma Chi (No. 91-2684).
25. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 795
(E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
26. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393.
27. Id. at 389-90.
28. For a discussion of the possible meaning and significance of the phrase "inherently ex-
pressive," see infra notes 107-41 and accompanying text.
29. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 391.
30. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
31. Id. at 404. To pass the Johnson test, the actor must have intended "to convey a particu-
larized message" and there must have been a great likelihood "that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed" the conduct. Id. For a discussion of the Johnson test, see infra notes
56-64 and accompanying text.
32. Brief of Appellants at 9, Sigma Chi (No. 91-2684).
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contest were subjected to this test, the university reasoned, it would prop-
erly be judged unprotected conduct.33 The court of appeals disagreed, hold-
ing that because the contest was inherently expressive entertainment, the
Johnson test was inapplicable. 4 The court further ruled that even if the
Johnson test were applied, the contest would emerge from scrutiny as pro-
tected conduct: the fraternity's intended message was that the university's
concerns about race and gender should be treated in a humorous manner
and the subsequent signing of the petition demonstrates that the audience
understood this message.3"
Because the contest was expressive conduct entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, the court held, the university could not restrict it.3 6 Rather,
the university must find other means of achieving its goal of providing a
learning environment that is not hostile to women and racial minorities.3 7
Judge Murnaghan, concurring in the judgment, objected to the major-
ity's finding that universities cannot restrict speech or expressive conduct
that conflicts with important aspects of their educational mission, pointing
to a line of Supreme Court cases in which he argued the Court had ruled to
the contrary.38 But, Judge Murnaghan wrote, First Amendment law need
not have been invoked to dispose of the case. Rather, the dispute should
have been resolved wholly on due process grounds because a university
official had approved the event beforehand,39 and the university had never
33. Id.
34. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 392.
35. Id.; see supra note 31. As yet a third basis for its holding, the court stated that, under
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), the university could not sanction
conduct expressing ideas that "ran counter to the views the University sought to communicate to
its students and the community," while "encouraging... conduct that would further the viewpoint
expressed in the University's goals." Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393.
36. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 394 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Murnaghan cited cases
holding that a "content-based regulation of protected speech survives judicial scrutiny if it is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Ia
(Murnaghan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991); Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 44-45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)). For a discussion of cases concern-
ing universities' powers of restriction, see infra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
39. The district court found that Kathryn Schilling, the university's Assistant Director of
Student Organizations and Programs, had approved the Derby Days program beforehand, includ-
ing the "ugly woman contest." Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ.,
773 F. Supp. 792, 793 (E.D. Va. 1991), afT'd, 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993). In its brief to the
Fourth Circuit, however, George Mason University insisted that no university official had con-
sented to the program and that in her affidavit Ms. Schilling expressly denied approving the event.
Brief of Appellants at 8, Sigma Chi (No. 91-2684).
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prescribed any rules that would communicate to its students that such be-
havior would not be allowed.40
The guarantee of freedom of speech is found in the First Amend-
ment.41 The First Amendment protects from abridgement both the spoken
and written word, as well as expressive conduct.42 The Supreme Court ex-
tended First Amendment protection to expressive conduct as early as 1931,
in Stromberg v. California.4 3 In Stromberg, the Court held that a statute
that prohibited displaying a red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of oppo-
sition to organized government" was unconstitutional, since it might be
construed as barring "conduct which the State could not constitutionally
prohibit," due to the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Not all conduct, however, implicates the First Amendment. In United
States v. O'Brien,45 the defendant had been convicted of burning his Selec-
tive Service registration certificate on the local courthouse steps.46 He ar-
gued on appeal that the statute under which he had been convicted was
unconstitutional as applied to him, because his conduct was protected by
the First Amendment.47 The Supreme Court rejected the notion that a "lim-
itless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person en-
gaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."48 The O'Brien
Court refrained, however, from articulating a test for determining when
conduct is sufficiently expressive to merit the label of "speech." 49 Instead,
the Court assumed arguendo that O'Brien's conduct was sufficiently com-
40. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 394 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also infra
note 158. Consideration of such due process concerns is beyond the scope of this Note.
Because the university had not established rules prohibiting such conduct, the doctrine of
prior restraint was not implicated in this case. It is nevertheless interesting to note that, despite the
high level of scrutiny accorded to prior restraints on speech and expressive conduct, see, e.g.,
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2773 (1993); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975), Judge Murnaghan suggested that the university could have "re-
fused to allow the Fraternity to perform its intended skit." Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 395
(Murnaghan, J., concurring in the judgment). For a brief introduction to the concept of prior
restraint, see LAURENCE H. TUm, AmEUicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-34 (2d ed. 1988).
41. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
43. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
44. Id. at 369. Specifically, the Court held that the statute could be read as prohibiting "free
political discussion." Id.
45. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
46. Id. at 369.
47. Id. at 371.
48. Id. at 376.
49. The Court did, however, formulate a four-part test for determining the validity of govern-
ment restrictions on conduct, once the conduct has been determined to have both "speech" and
"non-speech" elements. See infra note 72.
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municative to "bring into play the First Amendment" and disposed of the
case on other grounds.5
Six years later, in Spence v. Washington,5 the Supreme Court more
directly addressed the question of what constitutes protected expressive
conduct under the First Amendment. Spence had been convicted under a
state statute prohibiting "improper use" of the American flag, after he had
placed black tape on a flag in the form of a peace symbol, and hung the flag
upside down, from his apartment window, to protest United States military
action in Vietnam. 2 The Court first held that to constitute expressive con-
duct worthy of First Amendment protection, the actions must be "suffi-
ciently imbued with elements of communication. 53 After noting that both
"the nature of [the person's] activity" and "the factual context and environ-
ment in which it was undertaken" are pertinent factors in the determination,
the Court found in the case before it that "[a]n intent to convey a particu-
larized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the like-
lihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."'54 Consequently, the Court held, Spence's conduct was "a form
of protected expression."
55
50. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. O'Brien's actions exemplify a fact that no student of the First
Amendment could miss: The tumultuous period of the 1960s and early 1970s provided numerous
opportunities for the Court to distinguish between expressive conduct and conduct that is outside
the protection of the First Amendment. In addition to O'Brien, see Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 405-08 (1974) (concerning a man who in 1970 placed black tape on his American flag
in the form of a peace symbol, then hung the flag upside down, from his apartment window, to
protest American military action in Vietnam); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 172-75 (1972) (deal-
ing with university students who wished to establish a local chapter of an organization that had
helped to organize numerous campus protests); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 105
(1972) (involving student participants in a demonstration designed to draw attention to inequities
faced by African American students); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972)
(regarding a man who picketed a local high school, claiming that the school discriminated against
African Americans); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (concerning a man who walked
through the local courthouse wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the draft" displayed across it);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1970) (involving a man charged with unlawfully
wearing an American military uniform, during a street-comer skit designed to protest the Ameri-
can presence in Vietnam); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1969) (regarding a man
who, upon hearing that civil rights leader James Meredith had been shot, took his American flag
to a nearby street comer and burned it, telling the crowd "We don't need no damn flag!"); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (concerning students who
wore black armbands "to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam"); and Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 136 (1966) (involving African-American students who had staged a
"sit-in" in a "whites only" area).
51. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
52. Id. at 406-07.
53. Id. at 409.
54. Id. at 409-11.
55. Id. at 410.
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In Texas v. Johnson,5 6 a 1989 case involving flag burning, the
Supreme Court returned to Spence to determine when conduct merits First
Amendment protection. To receive such protection, the Johnson Court
held, conduct must pass a two-part test: (1) the actor must have intended to
" 'convey a particularized message,"' and (2) there must have been a great
likelihood " 'that the message would be understood by those who viewed
[the conduct]."'"7
Although the Court did not formally frame this test until Johnson, it
declared that the Johnson principles had been guiding its First Amendment
jurisprudence for at least half a century. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, clarified this by pointing to a series of the Court's decisions in-
volving flags, extending back to 1931, as examples of the ways in which the
Court had applied the test in the past.-" As additional instances of the
Court's application of the two-part test, Justice Brennan cited the Court's
decisions in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,59 in which the Court held that the First Amendment protects students
wearing black armbands to protest United States involvement in Vietnam;
Brown v. Louisiana,60 in which the Court extended First Amendment privi-
leges to African Americans staging a "sit-in" in a "whites only" area; and
Schacht v. United States,61 in which the Court found that the First Amend-
ment protects an actor in a dramatic presentation.6
The Court did not qualify the application of the Johnson two-part test;
it simply stated that the test is appropriate for determining "whether particu-
lar conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play.",63 Whether the Court intended the test to govern all
types of conduct in nevertheless unclear.'
56. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
57. Id. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
58. Id. at 404-05. These decisions include Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11, see supra notes 51-55
and accompanying text; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-42
(1943) (holding that because the flag salute is a form of symbolic utterance, school authorities
may not compel students to perform it); and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,369-70 (1931)
(holding that displaying a red flag is expressive conduct).
59. 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969).
60. 383 U.S. 131, 141-43 (1966).
61. 398 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1970); see also infra note 103.
62. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
63. Id.
64. The requirement that there be a great likelihood "'that the message would be understood
by those who viewed [the conduct],"' id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974)), raises potential problems. For example, one can pose what might be called the
problem of "difficult art." A dancer, for example, might choreograph a series of brilliantly inno-
vative movements, fully intending to convey a particularized message. Yet the complexity of the
dance might render its intended meaning quite unlikely to be understood by those viewing it.
Merely as an intuitive matter, it seems unlikely that the Court would rule that the series of dance
[Vol. 72
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Two years after the Court's decision in Johnson, in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.,65 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the First
Amendment protects nude dancing. The Court did not employ the Johnson
analysis, even though dance is indisputably a form of conduct; rather, the
Court simply looked to its previous statements on the subject.66 Having
reviewed the Court's prior decisions,67 the Justices concluded that "nude
dancing... is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment."
68
Despite the First Amendment's broad protection of speech and expres-
sive conduct, that protection "is not absolute at all times and under all cir-
cumstances. 69 The Supreme Court, for example, has identified particular
kinds of expression that may be completely restricted. "IT]he lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace"-have been held not to require First Amendment
protection because "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality."70 In addition, when expressive conduct has
non-speech elements, the government might be permitted to apply "inciden-
tal" restrictions on that expression. In United States v. O'Brien,71 a case
concerning the burning of draft-registration certificates, the Court held that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."72 The government may also impose reasonable "time, place,
steps-by virtue of its artistic brilliance-is unprotected by the First Amendment. See infra notes
134-35 and accompanying text.
65. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
66. Id. at 2460.
67. See id. (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); and California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)).
68. Il at 2460. Largely due to the absence of a Johnson-type analysis in such cases, at least
two student authors have suggested or implied that the Johnson test is intended to be applied only
to "non-inherently expressive" activities. See Zachary T. Fardon, Recent Development, Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc.: Nude Dancing and the First Amendment Question, 45 VmD. L. REv. 237,
270 (1992); Timothy M. Tesluk, Comment, Barnes v. Glen Theatre: Censorship? So what?, 42
CASE W. REs. L. Ray. 1103, 1106 (1992). As will be discussed infra notes 103-41, however, the
matter is not quite as clear as that.
69. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
70. Id. at 572.
71. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
72. Id. at 376. When the government's interest in regulating the conduct is indeed unrelated
to the conduct's "speech" element, the four-part test for constitutionality announced by the
O'Brien Court applies. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). Under the O'Brien test, a
governmental regulation is
19941
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and manner" restrictions on expressive conduct, under certain
circumstances.7 3
Of particular relevance to the Sigma Chi decision, govern-
ment-imposed restrictions may, in some instances, consist of content-based
restraints on speech or expressive conduct.7 4 The Court repeatedly has in-
sisted that the government may not restrict communication merely because
some may find it offensive.7' Rather, content-based restrictions are sub-
jected to "the most exacting scrutiny," 76 in the form of a stringent two-part
test: the restriction must (1) further a substantial or compelling government
interest, and (2) be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.
77
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
73. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). "The crucial question," the
Court wrote in Grayned, "is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. at 116. The analysis applied to these
restrictions is essentially identical to the four-part test announced by the O'Brien Court. Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456,2460 (1991); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,407 (1989); see
also supra note 72.
74. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992). For a good introduction
to both "incidental" and "content-based" restrictions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMaircAN CONS"-
TTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2, 12-3 (2d ed. 1988). See also supra note 38.
75. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ('The mere fact that
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
unprotected."); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) ("[Any suggestion that the
Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that
speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment."); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 ("If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.");
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("Mhe fact that society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[Glovemment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
76. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981);
see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) ("[J]ustifications for selective exclusions
from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized."); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99 ("When govern-
ment regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum .... the justifica-
tions offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.").
77. Simon & Schuster v. New York State Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991); Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy has argued
that this two-part test was derived wholly from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence and
"has no real or legitimate place when the Court considers the straightforward question whether the
State may enact a burdensome restriction of speech based on content only." Simon & Schuster,
112 S. Ct. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Having voiced his objections, Justice
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of a particular in-
stance of speech or conduct may acquire a special dimension when the
speech or conduct occurred in an educational context. There was a time
when a narrow judicial rendering of students' constitutional rights may
have discouraged First Amendment litigation against universities. 78  Con-
sider, for example, a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1891:
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by
those having the right to control him, [the student] necessarily
surrenders very many of his individual rights. How his time shall
be occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment;...
his hours of study and recreation, -in all these matters, and
many others, he must yield obedience to those who, for the time
being, are his masters ....
This view of students' constitutional. rights, to the extent it still had
adherents, was largely eviscerated by the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.s0 Justice
Fortas, writing for the majority in Tinker, stated that neither students nor
teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate."'" The Justice further wrote that students
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be con-
fined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to free-
dom of expression of their views.8 2
Three years later, Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the Court, simi-
larly observed that the Court's past decisions
leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged
need for order [at schools], First Amendment protections should
apply with less force on college compuses [sic] than in the com-
Kennedy nevertheless acknowledged that the two-part test had indeed "found its way into [the
Court's] First Amendment jurisprudence.' Id. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. One student author noted that, earlier this century,
[E]ven at the university level .... constitutional litigation was long discouraged by a
judicial attitude similar to that which once inhibited constitutional challenges to state
regulations by public employees-the notion that attendance at a public institution is a
privilege which can be conditioned on the waiver of constitutional liberties. This view
of the constitutional rights of the public university student appears moribund.
Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1129 (1968).
79. North v. Board of Trustees, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1891).
80. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
81. Id. at 506. The majority argued that the cited proposition had been "the unmistakable
holding of th[e] Court for almost 50 years." Id. In dissent, Justice Black expressly denied this
claim. Id. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 511.
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munity at large. Quite to the contrary, "the vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commu-
nity of American schools."83
The Court is not eager, however, to intervene in school affairs, prefer-
ring to leave matters of school rules and disciplinary procedures to school
officials.84 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to hold that students' First
Amendment freedoms may be restricted by school officials in ways that the
State might not ordinarily be able to restrict the expression of its citizens.8"
The Court has justified this restrictive approach because of the "special
characteristics of the school environment."86
In Tinker, the Court announced the primary test to which school re-
strictions on expression must be subjected.87 There, the Court held that
students' expression may be restricted when it "materially and substantially
disrupt[s] the work and discipline of the school."88 Although Tinker in-
83. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487
(1960)).
84. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278-79 (1988) (Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting) ("The public educator's task is weighty and delicate
indeed.... Accordingly, we have traditionally reserved" the operation of the schools "to the
States and their local school boards."); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986) ("The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board."); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In my opinion, a university should be allowed
to decide for itself' which programs should be given use of limited school facilities.); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint .... Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.").
85. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 266 ("A school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' . . . even though the government
could not censor similar speech outside the school." (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 685));
Healy, 408 U.S. at 203 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result) ("The government as employer or
school administrator may impose upon employees and students reasonable regulations that would
be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens.").
86. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Subsequent Court decisions have imbued those words of Justice
Fortas with important meaning. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 266 ("We have
nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools 'are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."' (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist.,
478 U.S. at 682), "and must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment."' (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 ("In the context of the
'special characteristics of the school environment,' the power of the government to prohibit 'law-
less action' is not limited to acts of a criminal nature." (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)).
87. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
88. Id. at 513. The Court extracted this test from the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Id.
The Tinker test has been invoked on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272 (acknowledging that Tinker provides the standard "for
determining when a school may punish student expression"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77 (af-
firming the right of a university "to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reason-
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volved the expressive conduct of junior high and high school students, the
Court has expressed its willingness to apply the Tinker test to the speech
and conduct of college students as well.8 9 Whether applied in the context
of elementary, secondary, or post-secondary educational institutions, the ba-
sis for the Tinker test would appear simply to be the Court's recognition of
"the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an
environment free from disruptive interference with the educational pro-
cess." 90 Mere fear of disturbance, however, is not enough to justify a
school's restriction of student expression.91
Although the Court has demonstrated a willingness to invoke the
Tinker test in any educational context, the Court has applied the test differ-
ently to junior high schools, high schools, and universities.9" In Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,93 the Court held that
it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.
Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes
able campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an
education"); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 ("[A]ctivities need not be tolerated where they infringe rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education."). For other cases generally dealing with permissible restrictions
on student expression, see Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation, What Oral Statement of Student Is
Sufficiently Disruptive So As to Fall Beyond Protection of First Amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED. 599
(1986).
It is not the case, however, that only when expression "materially and substantially disrupt[s]
the work and discipline of the schoor may a school restrict it. The Court rejected that reading of
Tinker in Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 270 n.2 ("[T]he proposition that 'foinly speech that
'materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline' can be
found unacceptable and therefore be prohibited' ... does not ... even accurately reflect our
holding in Tinker." (emphasis added)).
89. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), a case involving First Amendment rights of
students at Central Connecticut State College, the Court held that actions may be prohibited that
"'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the schoor... [A]ctivities need
not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id. at 189 (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). The Court reaffirmed its adherence to this view in
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77 (affirming "the continuing validity of cases" such as Healy "that
recognize a university's right to exclude even First Amendment activities" in particular
circumstances).
90. Healy, 408 U.S. at 171.
91. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
92. The Court applies the First Amendment in accordance with the "special characteristics of
the school environment." Id. at 506.
93. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The in-
culcation of these values is truly the "work of the schools."94
Both Bethel and Tinker involved the speech and conduct of students en-
rolled at junior high and high schools. The Bethel Court, moreover, made it
clear that the students' young ages heavily influenced its decision: "It does
not follow ... that simply because the use of an offensive form of expres-
sion may not be prohibited to adults.., the same latitude must be permitted
to children.
95
Yet in Healy v. James,96 a case in which the Court considered a uni-
versity's refusal to grant recognition to an organization that school officials
feared would promote campus disruption and violence,97 the Court struck a
strikingly different chord:
[Tihe wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms
of expression and association is not without its cost in terms of
the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society. In-
deed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and else-
where, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we
deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional
privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of
others certainly should not be tolerated, we reaffirm the principles
of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is
founded.98
Perhaps in an elaboration of the Tinker test, the Court in HazeIwood
School District v. Kuhlmeie 99 held that "[a] school need not tolerate stu-
dent speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational "ission.,o In
an earlier case, however, the Court stated that the contents of a university's
mission statement do not automatically "exempt [the school's] actions
from constitutional scrutiny."101
It was in light of these First Amendment principles that the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide Iota Xi Chapter of
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University.102 At the heart of the
Court of Appeals's ruling is the conclusion that the fraternity's "ugly wo-
94. Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) and Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 508, respectively).
95. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682. The Court further noted that the speech the student
plaintiff had given at a school assembly, which was the subject of the dispute, "was acutely insult-
ing to teenage girl students," and "could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience,
many of whom were only 14 years old." Id. at 683.
96. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
97. Id. at 171-76.
98. Id. at 194.
99. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
100. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
101. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981).
102. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
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man contest' was inherently expressive conduct because of its skit for-
mat. 0 3 Without attempting to define the phrase "inherently expressive
conduct"-other than to suggest that skits and various other forms of en-
tertainment are within its scope4--the court held that all such conduct is
automatically entitled to First Amendment protection 1 5 and therefore need
not be subjected to the two-part test announced by the Supreme Court in
Texas v. Johnson.06 The court's failure to lay a foundation for that conclu-
sion suggests the court believed it was adhering to established precedent. In
reality, however, the court may have established a new mode of First
Amendment analysis.
The notion of "inherently expressive" conduct has enjoyed very lim-
ited currency in court opinions; to the extent that the phrase has been used,
there has been little agreement regarding the kinds of conduct that exem-
plify it. Of all reported state and federal cases, the phrase "inherently ex-
pressive" had been used in only six decisions prior to Sigma Chi."7 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in 1983, appears to
have been the first to use the phrase. The court noted that in most cases
involving restrictions on symbolic speech, the given activity was "inher-
ently expressive," since the vast majority of people engaging in those activ-
103. Id. at 391 (emphasis added). In focusing on the contest's skit format, the court relied in
part on Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), in which the Supreme Court construed a
statute permitting actors to wear military uniforms in theatrical productions to shield from punish-
ment even actors in "crude and amateurish" performances. Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62. The court
in Sigma Chi acknowledged that Schacht involved the interpretation of a statute, Sigma Chi, 993
F.2d at 390, but justified its reliance on the case by observing that, in Schacht, "Justice Black...
declare[d] that an actor participating in even a crude performance enjoys the constitutional right
to freedom of speech." Id. Justice Black had written: "An actor, like everyone else in our coun-
try, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the
Government during a dramatic performance.' Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63.
Justice Black's opinion in Schacht may simply be read as pointing out that, merely because a
person has assumed a dramatic role, the words leaving that person's mouth do not lose their
constitutional protection. This reading of Justice Black is subtly, yet significantly, different than
the Fourth Circuit's reading of those words. The Fourth Circuit apparently interpreted Justice
Black's statement to stand for the proposition that because one is participating in a dramatic
performance, one is automatically entitled to First Amendment protection.
104. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 390-92.
105. Id. at 391-92.
106. 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
107. In three of those decisions, the phrase appears unintended to import any particular signifi-
cance to the court's First Amendment analysis. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct.
1950, 1958 (1991) (finding that employees in a prior case, Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airway &
S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984), who objected to the use of union funds, were not complaining
because of any inherently expressive quality of the funded activities); Clarke v. United States, 886
F.2d 404, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that "[a] legislator's vote is inherently expressive"); Russ
v. Jordan, No. C-92-1084MHP, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19484, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1992)
(stating that "there is nothing inherently expressive about watching a demonstration").
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ities "will do so in order to express something thereby."'1 8  Significantly,
the court cited three examples of "inherently expressive conduct," examples
the Supreme Court later used in Texas v. Johnson" to exemplify its past
implementation of the two-part test for expressive conduct.110 Conse-
quently, a reading of those two decisions alone suggests that inherently ex-
pressive activities are in no way exempt from the Johnson analysis.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the phrase in a 1990
decision, Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,"' finding that dance is a form
of inherently expressive conduct." 2 Having made this observation, the
court nevertheless proceeded to conclude that the two-part Johnson test
must be applied to decide whether nude dancing is an activity entitled to
First Amendment protection." 3 For the Seventh Circuit, it is therefore
clear that inherently expressive conduct is subject to the Johnson analysis.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Miller case and handed
down Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc."4 The respondents urged the Court to
reject the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and to hold that the Johnson test
should be applied only "to handle those 'arguable' situations where the ac-
tivity is inherently conduct, yet asserted to be undertaken to convey a par-
ticularized message."" 5 Significantly, the Court remained silent on the
issue, letting stand the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that inherently expres-
sive conduct is governed by the Johnson analysis." 6
In his concurrence in Barnes, Justice Scalia wrote that he would define
"inherently expressive" conduct as "conduct that is normally engaged in for
108. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
109. 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
110. As examples, the appellate court cited the burning of draft cards, the wearing of arm
bands, and the superimposition of a peace symbol on an American flag. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 703 F.2d at 617. The court then contrasted those activities with the practice of
camping in public parks as a means of demonstrating the plight of the homeless, and concluded
that camping, as an activity with "a great deal of independent significance... has expressive First
Amendment value only in a very limited set of circumstances." Id. at 617-18.
111. 904F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nor. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., III S.
Ct. 2456 (1991).
112. Id "Attempts to distinguish between expressive and nonexpressive dance," the Miller
court wrote, "are misconceived .... Id. at 1086.
113. Id. at 1086. The court concluded that nude dancing was indeed protected expressive
conduct. Id. at 1086-87.
114. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), rev'g Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1990).
115. Brief for Respondents Glen Theatre, Inc., et al. at 25, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
116. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit on other grounds. The Supreme Court did not
itself employ the Johnson analysis, however, it simply declared that, in light of established prece-
dent, "nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
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the purposes of communicating an idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone
else"1 7 -a definition substantively identical to the one pronounced by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.'18 He doubted that
dancing, the particular activity before the Court, was an example of such
conduct. 119 He then gave as an example of inherently expressive conduct
the flying of a red flag' 2°-a clear reference to the Court's 1931 decision in
Stromberg v. California.2' Of particular importance is the fact that the
Johnson Court had cited Stromberg two years earlier as an example of a
Supreme Court decision that conformed to, and which presumably required
the application of, the Johnson two-part test for expressive conduct.
122
Justice Souter also took up the issue of inherent expressiveness in his
concurrence in Barnes.123 He reasoned that "[n]ot all dancing is entitled to
First Amendment protection as expressive activity"-aerobic exercise, for
example, "would... be outside the First Amendment's concern."124 Jus-
tice Souter continued with words that may be of great significance:
[D]ancing as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical
audience gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feel-
ing, and where the dancer is nude or nearly so the feeling ex-
pressed, in the absence of some contrary clue, is eroticism,
carrying an endorsement of erotic experience .... [S]uch per-
formance dancing is inherently expressive .... '25
Those words may hold the key to resolving the "inherent expressive-
ness-Johnson" issue. As noted previously, 126 the Court's Spence v. Wash-
ington decision' 7-from which the Johnson Court drew its two-part
test128 -emphasized the relevance of "the factual context and environment"
in which an activity is performed. 129 As Justice Souter's method of reason-
ing implied, it is from context that one can infer the presence of both an
117. Id. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
118. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
rev'd sub norn. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); see also
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
119. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment). Contra Miller v.
Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nor. Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
120. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
121. 283 U.S. 359, 366 (1931); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
122. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989); see also supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
123. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
127. 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
128. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
129. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. The Johnson Court reiterated the enormous importance of con-
text. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
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intent to convey a message, and an audience likely to understand it. Indeed,
the context of the dancing in Barnes led Justice Souter to conclude that the
activity was inherently expressive.
The crucial insight that Justice Souter may have therefore provided is
this: A finding that an activity is inherently expressive, far from exempting
it from the Johnson test, may instead provide an invaluable tool with which
to conduct the necessary Johnson analysis. "[Iln the absence of some con-
trary clue,"13 a finding that a person engaged in what may be regarded as
an inherently expressive activity-such as dancing before an audience, per-
forming a skit, or any other conduct "normally engaged in for the purpose
of communicating an idea, or... emotion, to someone else"'131-may be all
but conclusive in finding that an intent to convey a particularized message,
Johnson's first prong, was in fact present.
This reading of the cases is in accord with the Seventh Circuit's rea-
soning in Miller,"'32 with the Supreme Court's refusal to correct that reason-
ing in Barnes;1 33 and, perhaps most significantly, with the Court's holdings
in First Amendment cases involving the arts. 34 Activities such as perform-
ing music and acting in a dramatic performance, absent "some contrary
clue," always take place for the purpose of conveying an idea or feeling,
before an audience likely (or at least eager) to understand or experience it.
Consequently, because of the Court's well-established reluctance to tram-
mel individuals' First Amendment rights,135 those who engage in such ac-
tivities will, in all but extraordinary cases, be regarded as engaging in
protected conduct.
Finally, the examples of past decisions cited by the Johnson Court
136
to show the consistency of the Court's application of the two-part test-and
presumably also the kinds of activities that require the application of that
test-include instances of conduct that are surely inherently expressive.
Justice Scalia, for example, regards the flying of a red flag as inherently
130. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
131. Id. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, 3., concurring in the judgment).
132. 904 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2456 (1991); see also supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
134. The Court has held, for example, that "motion pictures ... and live entertainment, such
as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee." Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
135. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (acknowledging the difficulty
in discerning an exposition of ideas from pure entertainment and electing to err on the side of
protection).




expressive."' Saluting the flag-another of the Johnson Court's exam-
ples'138 -is certainly inherently expressive. Just as dancing before an audi-
ence is inherently expressive conduct according to Justice Souter,139 the act
of placing one's hand over one's heart or at one's brow while at the same
time orienting oneself toward an American flag is an activity nearly always
engaged in for the purpose of communicating an idea or emotion to some-
one else-the idea of allegiance to the United States or the feeling of patri-
otism.' 4 The Johnson Court suggested that such activities are indeed
subject to the two-part test. 4
Under this reading of the law, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Sigma
Chi that the Johnson test is inapplicable to inherently expressive conduct' 42
stands in disregard of Supreme Court precedent. 43 The error would be of
no practical consequence to the parties involved in Sigma Chi, though, if
the court were correct in stating that even if the Johnson test were applied,
the "ugly woman contest" would "qualif[y] as expressive conduct."'" Yet
the court's reasoning on this point is subject to criticism as well. The court
held that, based on the university's objection to the racist and sexist themes
of the contest, "[iut is manifest... that the University officials thought the
Fraternity intended to convey a message."' 45 The court further concluded
that the fraternity's later apology suggested they, too, had intended to con-
vey a message.' 46  Finally, the court itself purported to identify the
message, stating that it was "evident... the Fraternity's purposefully non-
sensical treatment of sexual and racial themes was intended to impart a
137. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2466 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
138. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
139. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note
125 and accompanying text.
140. It should be noted, however, that the Johnson Court stated: "We have not automatically
concluded ... that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characteriz-
ing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it oc-
curred." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
141. Id. at 404-05. Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit's examples of inherently ex-
pressive activities, see supra note -10-examples later used by the Johnson Court to demonstrate
the application of its two-part test, see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text-are also activi-
ties normally engaged in for the purpose of communicating an idea or emotion. Surely those who
superimpose a peace symbol on an American flag and then fly the flag upside down, for example,
always do so in order to convey a message. The only remaining question is whether viewers are
likely to understand that message.
142. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 391.
143. See supra notes 114-41 and accompanying text.
144. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 392.
145. Id. The university's own brief to the court contradicted this assertion by stating that "the
University has no idea what expressive message, if any, was intended by the participants." Reply
Brief of Appellants at 2, Sigma Chi (No. 91-2684) (emphasis added).
146. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 392.
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message that the University's concerns . should be treated
humorously. "147
The problem with such a reading of the events is that it leaves no room
for common ignorance. One might infer from the fraternity's apology, for
example, that the participants had never given any thought to the racist and
sexist overtones of the display and later felt remorse at the offense they had
unintentionally caused. 14 8 The court's inference that the contest was in-
tended to convey a message that particular university policies lacked merit
and should be treated humorously may therefore have accorded the partici-
pants far more credit for their pre-event intellectual machinations than they
deserved. If this is true, then an intent to convey a particularized message
was lacking and, under Johnson, the conduct was not sufficiently expres-
sive to merit First Amendment protection. 49 George Mason University,
therefore, may very well have been correct in arguing that "discovery
w[ould] demonstrate that the contest does not merit characterization as a
skit but only as mindless fraternity fun, devoid of any artistic
expression."'
150
Assuming that the "ugly woman contest" did constitute expressive
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, however, the judges in the
majority may have strayed from Supreme Court precedent in holding that,
although the university "has a substantial interest in maintaining an educa-
tional environment free of discrimination and racism," the university could
not achieve those goals by selectively limiting speech.'15  Judge
Murnaghan, in his concurring opinion, took the majority to task for that
holding, arguing that George Mason "does have greater authority to regu-
late expressive conduct within its confines as a result of the unique nature
of the educational forum."
152
While the judges may have ignored several pertinent Supreme Court
holdings, 153 it appears unlikely that recognition of those cases would have
147. Id.
148. One journalist appears to have given the events precisely that reading, commenting that
Organizers [of the contest] later apologized, saying they did not mean for anyone to
take offense. How could the organizers have been so blithely ignorant? Easy. As my
non-college-educated father once observed wisely, they may have a whole lot of book
sense, but that doesn't mean they have any common sense.
Clarence Page, Insensitive Students Get Taste of Own Bitter Medicine, ORLANDO SEMNEL TRm.,
Sept. 6, 1991, at A15.
149. Put another way, although the fraternity's contest was in the form of a skit, it would not
properly be regarded as protected expressive conduct if the "contrary clue" were established that
the participating fraternity members did not intend to convey a message. See supra notes 123-31
and accompanying text.
150. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 391.
151. Id. at 393.
152. Id. at 394 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
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led to a different result. Although universities do have the kind of authority
that Judge Murnaghan described, 154 it is not clear to what lengths George
Mason officials could lawfully have gone to achieve the university's goals.
Under the Court's holdings in Tinker, 55 Healy,156 and Widmar,157 George
Mason officials could have punished the fraternity1 8 if the contest had
"materially and substantially disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the
school."' 59 No facts in Sigma Chi suggest the conduct had such an effect,
however. As in Tinker, there was apparently no "material[] disrupt[ion
of] classwork."'160 Nor did the fraternity's contest "infringe reasonable
campus rules"' 6' or "substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education."' 62 Nor did the courts find that the contest
154. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
155. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
156. 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); see also supra note 89.
157. 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981); see also supra note 89.
158. This statement presupposes that there is no due process violation in imposing sanctions.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. An analysis of due process concerns is beyond the
scope of this Note. The reader who wishes to explore such issues, though, would do well to begin
with Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (regarding the notice of prohibited
speech and conduct that students must receive before a school may punish such speech and con-
duct). Also pertinent is the decision of a Michigan district court to strike down as unconstitutional
codes of speech and conduct promulgated by the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also supra note 4. One of the
court's bases for so holding was that the university had "never articulated any principled way to
distinguish sanctionable from protected speech." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867. As a result, in viola-
tion of students' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[s]tudents ... were neces-
sarily forced to guess at whether a comment about a controversial issue would later be found to be
sanctionable under the Policy." Id.
159. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. In Tinker, the conduct in question was the wearing of armbands
to protest American involvement in Vietnam. Id. at 504. Because the school could not show a
real threat of material and substantial disruption of the school's affairs--despite the fact that
hostile remarks were directed at the armband-wearing students, id. at 508-the school's restriction
of the conduct was held unconstitutional, id. at 514.
The relationship between the Tinker test and that set out by the Court for content-based
restrictions on speech imposed by the state, see supra notes 74-77, 88 and accompanying text, is
not entirely clear. But in finding that George Mason officials could not impose sanctions on the
fraternity, in part because the university "has available numerous alternatives to imposing punish-
ment on students based on the viewpoints they express," Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393, the court
appears to be employing something akin to the "narrowly drawn" princille that is used to scruti-
nize content-based restrictions on expression. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
160. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
161. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972). The university's briefs, as well as the deci-
sions of the district and appellate courts, make no reference to any such applicable campus rules.
162. Id. The university argued that the contest "interfere[d] with student learning," Brief of
Appellant at 3, Sigma Chi (No. 91-2684), and created "distractions to leamring," id. at 6. More-
over, the university had secured affidavits from "[flour educators" stating that the contest "inter-
fered with the educational pursuits of other students." Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Sigma Chi
(No. 91-2684). The district court nevertheless found that "there has been no substantial or mate-
rial disruption of GMU's educational mission." Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
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prompted "substantial disorder."163 Indeed, even if the university had
feared a disturbance as a result of the display, that fear would not have been
a constitutionally sufficient basis for sanctioning the fraternity, because
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression."'1
Moreover, because the Supreme Court has applied the Tinker analysis
differently to schools with students of different ages, with the result that
college and university students are accorded greater freedoms of expression
than younger students,165 George Mason officials faced an especially high
constitutional hurdle in their attempt to punish the fraternity. Assuming the
problems the "ugly woman contest" caused on the George Mason campus
are no more repugnant to the life of a university than the threat of physical
violence to students, then the Supreme Court's ruling in Healy v. James
66
all but forbade George Mason officials from sanctioning Sigma Chi. The
Healy Court's words, in fact, seem tailored to precisely the situation that
George Mason officials faced: "[Tihe wide latitude accorded by the Con-
stitution to the freedoms of expression and association is not without its
cost in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered soci-
ety.... [Yet] we reaffirm... the principles of the Bill of Rights ....,167
It may well be that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the
proper conclusion in Sigma Chi, when it held that George Mason officials
could not impose sanctions on the fraternity for their sponsorship of an
"ugly woman contest."1 6 The particular premises on which the court
founded that conclusion, however, are susceptible to criticism.
First, in its finding that "inherently expressive" conduct is automati-
cally entitled to First Amendment protection and need not be subjected to
the Johnson test, 69 the court employed a mode of analysis that is in conflict
with Supreme Court precedent. 70 Moreover, when the Sigma Chi court did
apply the Johnson test to make the point that the same result would have
George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 794 (E.D. Va. 1991) (emphasis added), affjd, 993 F.2d
386 (4th Cir. 1993). The appellate court did not address the issue.
163. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
164. Id. at 508. The Court added that "[a]ny word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on
the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk." Id.
165. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
166. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). At issue in Healy was the establishment at a state college of a local
chapter of an organization that had been linked to violent demonstrations on other campuses. Id.
at 169; see also supra notes 89, 96-98 and accompanying text.
167. Healy, 408 U.S. at 194.
168. See Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393. For example, the due process argument that persuaded
Judge Murnaghan, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text, does seem compelling. See
supra note 158.
169. Id. at 392; see also supra notes 31-34, 57 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
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been reached,17' its reasoning appears flawed. It seems likely, even prob-
able, that the participating fraternity members intended not to convey a par-
ticularized message concerning university policy, but only to make the
audience laugh.' 72 Although that distinction does little to diminish the feel-
ings of disgust the contest aroused in the minds of many,'73 it is crucial to
the determination of First Amendment protection.
Second, even if the "ugly woman contest" were found sufficiently ex-
pressive to implicate the First Amendment, the court's suggestion that uni-
versities may not selectively limit the speech of their students' 74 disregards
Supreme Court holdings to the contrary.175 It is settled that universities
may restrict the expression of their students in ways in which the State may
not restrict the speech of its citizens. 176 It is nevertheless doubtful that the
"ugly woman contest" created the kind of "material and substantial disrup-
tion of the work and discipline of the schoor' that would authorize univer-
sity officials to sanction it.
177
In certain respects, it is discouraging that this Note should conclude
with the suggestion that conduct so base might be shielded from a univer-
sity's sanctions. Many would be troubled indeed if, in the final analysis,
conduct that achieves no constructive purpose and serves only to alienate
and belittle members of the university community were found to be a neces-
sary evil of campus life. America's institutions of higher education have
long held themselves out as places dedicated to this nation's noblest princi-
ples, not the least of which is an unyielding commitment to the notion of
individual dignity. 17  Speech and conduct threatening that dignity would
seem to merit only the disapprobation that punishment may bring. Yet it is,
of course, that same commitment to high principles that gives rise to the
dilemma school officials and judges face when students speak or behave
offensively. Competing with the urge to punish is the desire to echo the
words of Justice Powell: 'Though we deplore the tendency of some to
abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke .... we reaffirm... the
principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is
founded."'
179
171. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 19, 148 and accompanying text.
174. Sigma Chi, 993 F.2d at 393.
175. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 87-89, 159-64 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 7.
179. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972).
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Not surprisingly, the tension between such principles has sparked
fierce debate."' 0 Established rules of analysis, such as those set out by the
Supreme Court in Tinker,'81 Healy,"8 2 and Johnson,"8 3 supply the initial
terms of discussion. The precise contours of the legal precepts that will be
forged in the heat of that debate, as it continues to be carried out in univer-
sity board rooms and in our country's courthouses, remain to be seen.
TODD EDWARD PEi-rYs
180. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
181. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); see also supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
182. 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); see also supra note 89.
183. 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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